Abstract: This paper develops a model where the incumbent may expand to a related market to signal economies of scope and deter entry in the former market. We show that the incumbent only expands when scope economies are large enough. Thus expansion is a signal of larger economies of scope and, for certain parameter values, leads to entry deterrence. Although our game is twoperiod, the expansion strategy creates a long-term advantage. We further investigate the implications of prohibiting an entry-deterrent expansion. A major finding is that, in our model, this prohibition always decreases consumer surplus. In terms of global welfare, the impact is ambiguous but negative for many parameter values.
Introduction
In this paper we study the entry deterrence when the incumbent benefits from economies of scope if he expands to another product's market. The paper shows that in the presence of economies of scope deterring entry may be welfare improving, since it increases efficiency and generates social surplus in the new market.
Economies of scope are usually related with the existence of inputs that may be shared among two or more production processes. These may be physical inputs, or "intangible" ones, such as, for instance, a given technology, managerial experience or a good sales team. Common examples of industries where economies of scope are relevant include telecommunications (share of inputs between long and short-distance calls, in the cellular market and even with the cable TV market, etc.), transportation (share of inputs between several routes in the airline industry or by railway companies), software (share of expertise between different programs or versions), the pharmaceutical industry (share of knowledge and/or components), etc.
1 As Cantos-Sánchez, Moner-Colonques, and Sempere-Monerris (2003) point out, in the presence of economies of scope regulatory measures aimed at one of the markets may affect competition in the other(s), and thus the overall welfare effect must be considered. This is actually taken into account in the current paper. The airline industry is a good example of economies of scope and of how expansion to a new market may lead to entry deterrence. This is especially true when a hub-and-spoke network is employed. In this case all traffic is connected to a hub, from where distribution takes place. The hub-and-spoke model allows managing assets such as airplanes, crew and land supporting systems as to better profit from economies of scope across different markets. The more routes are operated in this way, the stronger are the cost reductions achieved; this constitutes a motivation for expansion, as it may prevent rival entry both in former markets and in recently explored routes.
Economies of scope may arise through the fixed cost component of the multiproduct cost function (e.g. Röller and Tombak, 1990) and/or through the variable cost component (e.g. Dixon 1994 , who presents a model with diseconomies of scope arising from an interactive cost term).
2 In the present paper we consider that economies of scope arise through the variable costs in a very simple way: if the incumbent expands to a new market, its marginal costs decrease by an amount that depends on the degree of economies of scope but which is independent of the quantity sold in each market. Thus, in our model, the equilibria in the two markets are independent, which simplifies the model without changing its insights. We consider a two-period model where the incumbent's degree of economies of scope is private information. In the first period, facing potential entry, the incumbent decides whether or not to expand to a second market. The entrant observes the incumbent's choice and decides whether to enter or not in the first market, after updating his beliefs about the magnitude of the economies of scope. If entry occurs, firms compete in quantities. We characterize the equilibrium of this dynamic game and explore the welfare effects of entry deterrence under economies of scope.
Our paper is related to the entry deterrence literature and, in particular, to the incomplete information models. The first entry deterrence signalling model was developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) . In this model, a potential entrant has imperfect knowledge about the incumbent's production cost and the incumbent exploits this uncertainty by setting low prices, in order to make the entrant believe that entry is unprofitable. The model has been extended in several ways, namely by considering asymmetric information regarding demand instead of costs (McGahan 1992) and by considering the use of price and advertising as potential signals (Bagwell and Ramey 1988, 1990; Bagwell 2007) . More recent extensions analyse the dynamics of limit pricing using repeated signalling games (Kaya 2009; Toxvaerd 2010; Gedge et al. 2013). 3 However, there are several important differences between our model and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model and the vast majority of its extensions. The first, is that in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) the incumbent operates in a single market whereas in our model the incumbent firm may operate in several markets in order to benefit from economies of scope. 4 The second difference is that in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) the incumbent costs, which are private information, are exogenously given. Thus the only issue is whether the incumbent is able to use the prices it charges in the first period to signal to the entrant its true costs. On the contrary, in our model, by expanding to a related market the incumbent is able to reduce its costs, which may deter entry of other potential competitors. Thus costs are endogenous and the entry deterrent action is a cost-reduction decision. Finally, there are differences in the welfare analysis. While in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) consumers may benefit from lower prices in the first period although that may come at the expense of a more concentrated market structure in the second period, 5 in our model the consumers are not affected by the entry deterrent action in the first period, thus the trade-off for consumers in the first market is between a more efficient incumbent and a more concentrated market structure in the second period. In addition, our welfare analysis has to take into account the social surplus generated in the new market covered by the incumbent. It should be highlighted that there are other cost-reduction strategies (including learning economies and R&D decisions) that would have similar impacts in terms of entry deterrence. For instance, Cabral and Riordan (1997) argue that, in the presence of learning economies, driving rivals out of the market or preventing entry may allow achieving higher efficiency levels, and thus benefit consumers. Yang (2010) and Espínola-Arredondo and Muñoz-Garcia (2013) analyse signalling entry deterrence under learning by doing and the latter also stresses that there are smaller welfare losses (or larger welfare gains) when learning by doing is present. In our model, when the incumbent exploits the economies of scope, we also have the efficiency gain in the first market but, in addition, the expansion to a second market generates a social surplus in this market, an effect which is not present in the previous learning economies models. 6 Another recent article where the incumbent's investment decision is also cost-reducing is Espínola-Arredondo, Gal-Or, and Muñoz-Garcia (2011) . In this article the entrant is uncertain about the magnitude of demand and the incumbent faces a trade-off between expanding the business (by investing in larger plants, hiring more workers or other decisions) and, at the same time, signalling high demand to potential entrants, which increases the attractiveness of entry. Our model differs from Espínola-Arredondo et al. (2011) regarding the private information of the incumbent and also because, in our model, the incumbent may expand to a second market, which has important implications in terms of the incumbent's profit and the welfare analysis. Although entry deterrence behaviour under economies of scope has not been theoretically analysed, it is interesting that evidence of such behaviour has been recently found in industries that have been identified as having scope economies, such as health-care (Dafny 2005; Ellison and Ellison 2011) , airlines (Gedge et al. 2013 ) and cable TV markets (Seamans 2013) . Thus understanding entry deterrence under economies of scope is both relevant and novel.
To summarize, this paper shows that by expanding to another market the incumbent may benefit from economies of scope and hence become more efficient and be able to deter entry in the first market. This strategy has anti-competitive effects in the first market but generates social surplus in the new market and it increases the efficiency of the incumbent in the first market. Hence, the welfare impact of entry deterrence is ambiguous but likely to be positive.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: The next section presents the model and simple computations regarding the last stage of the game. In Section 3 we derive the entrant's optimal strategy while Section 4 shows the incumbent's optimal strategy. Section 5 presents the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. Section 6 studies the welfare impact of entry deterrence under economies of scope. Conclusions are summarized in the final section. The Appendix contains the proofs of all lemmas and propositions.
The model and some preliminary computations
Consider a two-period model where a monopolist incumbent, firm I, faces a potential entrant, firm E. In the first period the incumbent operates only in market A and decides whether to expand to a new independent market, market B, where the firm would be a monopolist. The products sold in markets A and B can be jointly produced and there are economies of scope. The degree of economies of scope is given by θ 2 0; 1 ½ . The marginal costs are equal to c 2 0; 1 ð Þ when a single product is produced and equal to θc when the two products are produced. So the lower is θ, the stronger is the degree of scope economies. This degree is private information. The entrant believes that θ is uniformly distributed on 0; 1 ½ and these beliefs are assumed to be common knowledge. Note that if the product sold in market A and market B is the same product, but A and B are two distinct geographic markets, our model can be reinterpreted as an economies of scale model.
In the first period, the incumbent decides whether to expand to market B (this decision is contingent on θ, the type of firm I). Firm E does not know the incumbent's type, but observes the expansion decision. In the second period, after observing the incumbent's expansion decision, the entrant updates his beliefs concerning the degree of economies of scope of the incumbent and decides whether to enter market A with an homogenous product (this decision is contingent on whether I expands to market B or not). If firm E does not enter market A it obtains a profit equal to zero. If firm E enters, the two firms decide simultaneously their quantities. In order to simplify computations we assume that, if firm E enters, the firm learns the incumbent's degree of economies of scope, θ, before the quantity decisions are taken.
7 This assumption is standard in signalling games as it simplifies the computations of the expected equilibrium profits when E enters. We could instead consider a three-period model where the entrant learns the magnitude of the scope economies in the third stage of the game, after competing with the incumbent in the second stage. In that case, in the subgames following I's expansion to market B and E's entrance, we would need to compute the Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game, as firm E would not be sure about the incumbent's degree of economies of scope. However, this would not change, in qualitative terms, our results.
On the other hand, if firm I expands to market B, the duopoly in market A is asymmetric (firm I has marginal costs θc, while firm E has marginal costs c). The equilibrium profits and the consumer surplus are given by:
Lemma 2: If it is optimal for the entrant not to enter market A when I does not expand to market B, then, regardless of beliefs, it is also optimal not to enter market A when I expands to market B.
The previous result does not depend on the entrant's beliefs. However, in general, when I expands to market B the optimal decision for the entrant depends on his beliefs about the degree of economies of scope of the incumbent. Let us assume that the entrant believes that the incumbent's types who expand to market B are the ones with larger economies of scope (later on we show that these beliefs are consistent with the incumbent's optimal strategy). If the entrant believes that I expands if and only if θ e θ where e θ 2 0; 1 ð ; then the posterior beliefs following I's expansion to market B should be that θ is uniformly distributed on 0; e θ h i
. Under these circumstances the optimal decision of the entrant is: Economies of Scope depends on whether the entrant never enters market A, always enters market A or enters if and only if I does not expand to market B (afterwards we analyse the case where E follows a mixed strategy whenever I expands to market B). However, we will show that the optimal strategy is always of the cut-off type: incumbent's types with θ below or equal to a certain cut-off value expand to market B, whereas incumbent's types with θ higher than the cut-off value do not expand to market B.
No threat of entry in Market A
A monopolist incumbent with no threat of entry would expand to market B if and only if
That is, the incumbent expands to market B if and only if the expansion costs are lower than the expansion benefits. The expansion benefits are equal to the discounted post-expansion profit in market B plus the discounted efficiency gain in market A. By expanding, the incumbent becomes more efficient in market A (his marginal cost decreases from c to θc) which increases the incumbent's monopoly profit in this market. Notice that the right hand side of the previous expression is decreasing with θ. This implies that if the previous condition is satisfied for θ ¼θ, then it will also be satisfied for all θ <θ and, conversely, if the condition is not satisfied for θ ¼θ; then it will also be not satisfied for θ >θ. This suggests that the optimal strategy of the incumbent is of the cut-off type:
Lemma 4: Suppose that the incumbent expects that E never enters market A. 
On the other hand, if
then the incumbent does not expand to market B for all θ 2 0; 1 ½ . then the optimal expansion decision is of the cut-off type: below θ m it is optimal to expand, above θ m it is optimal not to expand. In other words, the types who expand are the ones with higher economies of scope (lower θ).
all the incumbent types want to expand, which means that θ m ¼ 1.
Threat of entry and entry deterrence
Let us now study the optimal strategy of the incumbent when he expects that E does not enter if he expands to market B but enters otherwise. Given the expected entrant's strategy, the condition for expansion to be optimal for I is: 
Economies of Scope
Similar to Section 4.1, the expansion decision is based on the comparison between expansion costs and discounted expansion benefits. However, the discounted gain in market A is now larger as by expanding the incumbent remains a monopolist while if he does not expand he becomes a duopolist. Since δðÅ Since the right hand side of condition [2] is decreasing with θ, it is easy to show that the incumbent follows a cut-off strategy: 
then the incumbent does not expand to market B for all θ 2 0; 1 ½ .
It is interesting to compare the cut-off values of θ in the entry deterrence case with the cut-off values in the blockaded entry case. Note that, for given δ; θ and c, the RHS of condition [2] is higher than the RHS of condition
. This implies that the cut-off level, θ d , below which expansion to market B occurs when expansion deters entry is higher than the cut-off level when there is no threat of entry, i.e.
Intuitively, when expansion leads to entry deterrence the benefits of expanding to market B are equal to the profit in market B plus the benefit of being a monopolist with marginal costs θc < c instead of a duopolist with costs c. On the other hand, the benefits of expanding under no threat of entry are equal to the profit in market B plus the increase in the monopoly profit when costs drop from c to θc. Since expansion is more profitable under the threat of entry, expansion is optimal for lower economies of scope (higher θ).
Entry accommodation
If the incumbent cannot avoid entry in market A (E enters even if I expands to market B) his decision of expanding to market B is based on:
In this case, the expansion benefit is equal to the discounted post-expansion profit in market B plus the discounted efficiency gain in market A, considering that the incumbent is a duopolist in market A regardless of its expansion decision.
Since the right hand side of the previous condition is decreasing with θ, it is easy to show that the incumbent follows a cut-off strategy:
Lemma 6: Suppose that the incumbent expects that E enters market A regardless of his expansion decision. For given c; δ and f
there exists a cut-off value θ a 2 0; 1 ½ such that the incumbent expands to market B if and only if θ θ a .
The value of θ a depends on c; δ and f I as follows: the incumbent wants to expand to market B both in the case where expansion deters entry as well as in the case where E always enters in market A. The shaded area corresponds to the case where expansion to market B is just to deter entry (it would not occur under entry accommodation). Thus the shaded area is a region of "strategic expansion".
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium
Having described the optimal strategies of firms I and E, we are now ready to characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of the game. We restrict our analysis to the cases where f there exists a unique PBE. In this PBE the incumbent expands to market B for all θ 2 0; 1 ½ and, when I expands to market B, E believes that θ is uniformly distributed on 0; 1 ½ . In addition, the entrant's equilibrium strategy depends on f E as follows:
the entrant enters market A regardless of I's expansion decision.
the entrant enters market A if and only if the incumbent does not expand to market B.
When the incumbent's expansion costs are low, the incumbent expands to market B independently of his degree of economies of scope. On the other hand, the entrant's optimal strategy depends on his entry costs. , a contradiction. Similarly, if E always enters when I expands to market B, only types θ θ a want to expand to market B, but then it would be optimal for E not to enter as
the entrant has to follow a mixed strategy when I expands to B (enters with probability β). In the mixed strategy PBE, when I expands to market B, firm E is indifferent between entering and not entering. That is, θ 0 has to be such that condition [4] holds. In addition, type θ 0 is indifferent between expanding to market B or not, considering that firm E enters when I does not expand to market B and enters with probability β when I expands to market B. That is, β has to be such that condition [5] holds. It is worthwhile to explore how the mixed strategy PBE changes with f E .
When f E decreases, the value of θ 0 that satisfies condition [4] has to decrease in order to maintain the equality (in the PBE less incumbent's types expand to market B). Moreover, since the RHS of condition [5] is decreasing with β and with θ 0 , when θ 0 decreases, β has to increase in order to maintain the equality. As a consequence, the lower is f E , the higher has to be the probability of the entrant entering in market A when I expands to market B. Finally, the next proposition describes the PBE when the incumbent's expansion costs are high (but not so high that I never wants to expand to market B):
Proposition 3: For given δ; c, f E and
there may exist multiple PBE.
the following PBE exist: (a) The incumbent does not expand to market B for all θ 2 0; 1 ½ and the entrant enters market A regardless of I's expansion decision. The entrants equilibrium strategy can be sustained by the belief, when I expands to market B, that θ is uniformly distributed on 0; θ
8 Note that these are off-the-equilibrium path beliefs, since in equilibrium no incumbent type is expected to expand. Off-the-equilibrium path beliefs are unrestricted and it is possible to find other beliefs that support this PBE outcome, but these beliefs satisfy the intuitive criterion.
Economies of Scope
(b) The incumbent expands to market B if and only if θ θ 0 where θ 0 is such that:
If I expands to market B, E believes that θ is uniformly distributed on 0; θ 0 ½ ; and the entrant enters market A if firm I does not expand. In addition, firm E enters with probability β if I expands to market B, where β is the solution to: Although there are two possible PBE in case 1 of this proposition, the equilibrium described in 1.(a) can be ruled out if we impose further refinements upon off-the-equilibrium path beliefs. For instance, this equilibrium does not survive the Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) version of the divinity criterion, D1, and the universal divinity criterion.
Lemma 7: The PBE 1.(a) of Proposition 3 does not satisfy neither criterion D1 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) nor the universal divinity criterion.
Considering this result, from hereafter, in case 1 of Proposition 3, we assume PBE 1.(b).
For high expansion costs, expansion can only be optimal if it leads to entry deterrence. Moreover, the types who want to expand have very large economies of scope. For high f
), all types with θ θ d expand to market B and firm E does not enter when it observes expansion, hence we get an entry deterrence equilibrium. For lower entry costs, when I expands, firm E enters market A with some probability and thus fewer incumbent types expand to market B (the lower the entry costs, the higher is the probability of E entering when I expands). For given δ and f I , one can find the set of values in the space ðc; f E Þ which are compatible with entry deterrence, entry accommodation or with a mixed strategy PBE (see Figure 4) . The set of values in the space (c; f E Þ where the entry deterrence PBE equilibrium exists is represented in light grey. The region in dark grey is a region where there is a mixed strategy equilibrium and the region Cabral and Riordan (1997) call an action predatory if: (1) a different action would increase the likelihood that rivals remain viable, and (2) the different action would be more profitable under the counterfactual hypothesis that the rival's viability was unaffected. Our definition of entry deterrent expansion is similar:
Definition 1: Expansion to market B is entry deterrent if the following two conditions hold: 1. Not expanding to market B would increase the probability of E entering market A; 2. Not expanding to market B would be optimal for I under the counterfactual hypothesis that the rival's entry decision was unaffected.
If we use this definition of entry deterrence, only incumbent types with θ 2 θ a ; θ d Â Ã in the pure strategies PBE or with θ 2 θ a ; θ 0 ½ in the mixed strategies equilibrium behave so as to deter entry. If there was a social planner that can control the expansion decision and who has complete information about θ, would it be beneficial to prevent these types from expanding?
Expansion to market B by types θ 2 θ a ; θ
has anti-competitive effects in the future as it increases the likelihood of a monopoly in market A. However, expansion to market B generates social surplus in B and an efficiency gain in market A, due to economies of scope. Thus, in general, the welfare impact of prohibiting entry deterrence is ambiguous.
We need to concentrate our analysis in a set of parameter values such that so that, in equilibrium, expansion leads E not to enter with some probability while E enters when I does not expand (that is, we focus on cases 2 and 3 in Proposition 2 and Proposition 3).
The impact of a prohibition on consumer surplus
One interesting result in our model is that consumers are always worse off if entry deterrence is prohibited:
Proposition 4: If expansion to market B is entry deterrent, then consumers would be worse off with a prohibition of entry deterrence.
The previous result is quite strong as it indicates that benefitting consumers cannot be used as an argument to prevent entry deterrent expansion. It should be noted that the result refers to the aggregate consumer surplus. Consumers in market B are clearly worse off when entry deterrence is prohibited as preventing expansion implies that market B is not served. On the other hand, consumers in market A may either be better off or worse off if entry deterrence is prevented (it depends on the probability of E entering when expansion occurs and the degree of economies of scope). However, the aggregate consumer surplus is always higher if entry deterrence is allowed.
It is interesting to notice that prohibition of entry deterrence is particularly harmful for consumers when the equilibrium is a mixed strategies equilibrium. In this case, the anti-competitive effect of expansion only occurs with probability ð1 À βÞ, hence with probability β consumers will benefit from the scope economies efficiency gain while still enjoying the advantages of competition in market A.
The impact of a prohibition on welfare
Consumers are always worse off if entry deterrence is prohibited, but in order to evaluate the welfare impact of a prohibition against entry deterrence we also need to take into account the expansion and entry costs and the post-entry profits. In the next two subsections, we evaluate the welfare impact of a prohibition against entry deterrence, and show that such prohibition may either decrease welfare or increase welfare, depending on the parameter values.
Prohibition of entry deterrence decreases welfare
It is straightforward to show that, for certain parameter values, there is a welfare loss if entry deterrence is prohibited. One scenario that is favourable to show that welfare may be lower if entry deterrence is prohibited is when f I is high,
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. In this case all types who expand, expand for entry deterrence reasons (they would not expand if E enters). Moreover, the types who expand have very low θ, which implies that it is highly likely that expansion is optimal from a social point of view as economies of scope are large. The two next propositions show that when the expansion costs are high and δ is close to 1, entry deterrent expansion is welfare improving for many parameter values.
Economies of Scope
Proposition 5: If δ is close to 1 and θ is close to 0,
, then a prohibition against entry deterrent expansion decreases welfare for all c.
In other words, if f I is high, for δ close enough to 1 and θ small enough, preventing entry deterrence decreases welfare, for all c. When θ is small, economies of scope are very large, thus the social gains from expansion are high. Thus preventing types with very large economies of scope from expanding would decrease welfare. The next proposition complements the previous result as it shows that, when the expansion costs are high and δ is close to 1, for c above a certain level, a prohibition against entry deterrent expansion always decreases welfare.
Proposition 6: If δ is close to 1, It should be highlighted that the previous condition is a sufficient but not a necessary condition. In other words, prohibition against entry deterrence may decrease welfare under less strict conditions. The previous result suggests that if future is very important (δ is close to 1) and f I is high, prohibition of entry deterrence decreases welfare as long as c is not very low. It is quite interesting that a prohibition of entry deterrence decreases welfare when expansion costs are high. At the first sight one may think that higher expansion costs make expansion less socially desirable. However, higher expansion costs also mean that expansion is a signal of large economies of scope since the only types who expand are the ones with low θ. Considering the large economies of scope of the types who expand, preventing these types from expanding would decrease welfare. The result is easier to be satisfied when c is high because the efficiency gain due to economies of scope is higher when the original costs are high. In addition, when c is high the potential entrant is relatively inefficient, thus the fact that there is no competition in market A is not so harmful.
In the airline industry some regional markets may not be profitable on their own, so an incumbent would not expand to them if entry in other markets was not affected. However, if expansion prevents rival entry in already operated markets, incumbents with large economies of scope may gain by covering these regional markets. This may lead to welfare gains both due to the social surplus generated in the regional market that is now covered, and to the efficiency improvement in the previously explored routes.
Prohibition of entry deterrence increases welfare
To show that there are cases where prohibition of entry deterrent expansion may be welfare improving, we consider a scenario where all types want to expand when expansion deters entry but some of them would not expand under entry accommodation. In this case, there are types who expand to deter entry who have very small economies of scope. But these are the types for whom the social gain from expansion are lower, and thus it is possible that welfare improves by preventing these types from expanding. ffiffi ffi 6 p þ
, a prohibition against entry deterrent expansion increases welfare for θ close to θ d ¼ 1.
This result tells us that entry deterrence decreases welfare if economies of scope are very small and the entrant's entry costs are the minimum consistent with entry deterrence (with slightly lower entry costs, we would not have an entry deterrence equilibrium). Thus the combination of very small economies of scope and relatively small entry costs is favourable to the prohibition of entry deterrence (the fact that f I is relatively low is necessary for entry deterrent expansion to be optimal for types with small economies of scope).
Conclusion
Incumbent firms may decide to expand to a related market just to benefit from economies of scope and thus decrease unitary costs. However, expansion to a related market may also be used, in certain cases, to prevent possible rivals from entering in the first market as the incumbent becomes more efficient, which decreases the attractiveness of entry. In this article we explore this rationale for expanding to a related market and investigate whether such entry deterrent expansion can be welfare improving. We develop a model where the potential entrant does not know the degree of economies of scope of the incumbent. In the model, the decision of expanding to a related market can be used as a signal of the degree of economies of scope of the incumbent. We show that the incumbent's optimal strategy is always a cut-off strategy: the types who expand are the ones with higher economies of scope. Consequently, expansion is indeed a signal of larger economies of scope and, for certain parameter values, it leads to entry deterrence. For other parameter values, there is entry accommodation or a mixed strategy PBE where, when the incumbent expands to the related market, the entrant enters in the first market with some probability. The entry deterrence equilibrium occurs for intermediate or high values of the incumbent's expansion costs and relatively high entrant's entry cost. The intuition is that for higher expansion costs, expansion is a stronger signal that economies of scope are large, which is more likely to lead the potential rival not to enter.
Since expansion to a related market may occur exclusively for efficiency reasons, expansion cannot always be classified as an anti-competitive action. We define expansion to be entry deterrent if: (i) no expansion by the incumbent would increase the probability of potential rival's entry and (ii) not expanding would be optimal for the incumbent under the counterfactual hypothesis that the rival's entry decision was unaffected. If expansion to a related market is anticompetitive, should it be prohibited?
Our results suggest that the most likely answer is no! We show that a prohibition against entry deterrent expansion always decreases consumer surplus and it is likely to decrease welfare. This strong result is driven to a large extent by the fact that the incumbent's expansion to another market generates a large social surplus in the new market. But, considering the existence of economies of scope, it is possible that consumers in the first market are also better off under entry deterrence. It is true that there is less competition, which hurts consumers in this market, but the efficiency gain due to economies of scope may overwhelm the lower competition effect.
For simplicity we assume that demand functions are linear and identical in the two markets. None of these assumptions are essential for our qualitative results. For instance, the fact that the incumbent follows a cut-off strategy holds as long as the benefit by expanding increases with the degree of economies of scope, which certainly holds under more general demand assumptions. However, the demand assumptions influence the set of parameters where each type of equilibrium occurs and where an entry deterrent expansion may be welfare improving. For instance, if market B is smaller than market A, 9 expansion is optimal for a smaller set of parameters (expansion costs have to be lower and economies of scope have to be higher), but still there exists a set of parameters where entry deterrent expansion may occur (it occurs for lower expansion costs than in the case of identical demands). The relative size of the two markets seems to be more relevant for the welfare analysis. Having a smaller market B, decreases the consumer surplus gain in that market when the incumbent expands, hence our result that consumers are always worse off with a prohibition of entry deterrence may no longer be true. Note that, although the consumer surplus gain in market B is lower, the entry deterrence equilibrium happens for lower expansion costs, so it is not clear cut how the relative size of the markets influences the non-desirability of preventing entry deterrence. Thus an interesting extension of our work would be to consider different market demands and analyse how that influences the welfare results. Another venue of future research is to allow for the existence of competitors in market B. We believe that would not change our qualitative results regarding the types of equilibrium but would influence our welfare results. Intuitively, not prohibiting an entry deterrent expansion is more likely to be welfare improving when expansion to market B is socially desirable but expansion is only optimal for the incumbent if it deters entry. We know that under monopoly the non-appropriability of the social surplus leads to too little expansion. If expansion leads to entry deterrence, the incumbent has a further incentive to expand, which may bring private expansion incentives closer to the social optimum. With several firms, it is less likely that expansion to B is socially desirable as there also exists a business stealing effect (the more firms already operate in B, the less likely is that the incumbent's expansion increases welfare in B). Thus, our welfare results seem more likely to be relevant in cases where market B would not be served if the incumbent did not expand. there does not exist a PBE where E follows a pure strategy when I expands to market B.
Let us now check the mixed strategy PBE. In order for it to be optimal for E to follow a mixed strategy when I expands to market B, firm E has to be indifferent between entering and not entering. That is, θ 0 has to be such that condition [4] holds. Considering the optimal strategy of firm E (entering when I does not expand to market B, entering with probability β when I expands to market B), firm I should expand to market B if and only if: implies that if I expects E to always enter then I does not expand for all θ 2 0; 1 ½ .
To prove 1. (a) we just need to note that, given E's strategy, not expanding to market B is indeed optimal for all θ 2 0; 1 ½ . Moreover, when the incumbent does not expand to market B, it is optimal for E to enter by Lemma 1 and, given beliefs, it is also optimal to enter as f A ðθÞ be type θ's equilibrium payoff. Let e denotes the off-the-equilibrium path action of expanding and Dðθ; T ; eÞ be the set of mixed strategy best responses (MBR) of the entrant when the incumbent expands if the entrant's beliefs are concentrated on the set of types T that make type θ strictly prefer expanding to his equilibrium strategy. In other words, type θ is eliminated if the set of the entrant's responses that make type θ willing to deviate is strictly smaller than the set of responses that make type θ 0 willing to deviate. Since the set of mixed strategies for which θ > 0 wants to deviate (i.e. expand) is strictly smaller than the set of mixed strategies for which type θ ¼ 0 wants to deviate, all types except θ ¼ 0 are eliminated according to criterion D1. But if the entrant believes θ ¼ 0 when he observes expansion, we does not want to enter. Thus 1.(a) does not survive criterion D1. The proof that equilibrium 1.(a) of Proposition 3 does not satisfy the universal divinity criterion is similar as the only difference is that in order to eliminate type θ when e is observed the RHS of eq. [10] is substituted bÿ
